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Rate of New Vulnerabilities
• Remote vulnerability: exploit done over the network
• New vulnerabilities (2002, 2003): 
– ~80% of vulnerabilities are remote
– ~40% of vulnerabilities are remote + high severity
– ~2 new remote vulnerabilities per day  
Analysis of ICAT Vulnerabilities
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Time Until Worm Appearance Number of Hosts Infected
Threat from Known Vulnerabilities
• Intrusion Prevention: repair before attack.
– Identify all vulnerable hosts
– Understand the severity of the threat to your system
– Reliably repair all vulnerable hosts   
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In this talk
Intrusion prevention 
– Quickly identify all vulnerable hosts 
– Estimate severity of exposure to your system
– Reliably repair all vulnerable hosts
• Deficiencies of current identification process
• Envisioned intrusion prevention infrastructure
• Pilot study
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Today’s Network Audit Process
• Slow deployment: scripts are written manually
• Many false positives: some vulnerabilities cannot be 
exclusively determined over the network
• Ambiguous severity ratings: report does not quantify 
the severity of the threat to your site
• Ambiguous vulnerability specification: hard to tell 
what the vulnerability is from the script or description
Audit 
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Guestbook Vulnerability
From the ICAT database (CAN-1999-1053):
guestbook.pl cleanses user-inserted SSI commands by removing 
text between "<!--" and "-->" separators, which allows remote 
attackers to execute arbitrary commands when guestbook.pl is run 
on Apache 1.3.9 and possibly other versions, since Apache allows
other closing sequences besides "-->". 
Severity: High
• Misleading: actually the problem is that the script does not 
cleans SSI
• Incomplete: XBitHack must be set (SSI enabled)
• Provides unnecessary details: “<!--”
• Ambiguous specification of vulnerable host:
vulnerable if XBitHack is set (SSI enabled)
more vulnerable if guestbook.pl is installed
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Vulnerability Semantics
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Guestbook Semantics
7Expected Time to Attack (days) 
if (access(guestbook.pl) or 
content(guestbook.pl, 'html=1')) then 0;
else  TimeUntil(guestbook.pl installed)=30 
Expected Time 
to Exposure 
(days) 
if (version=1.3.9) then <SA,CIA> 
else UNKNOWN
Exposed 
Resources 
Severity 
H3,UNIX: config_file= /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf'Verification Hints 
P1: serviceRunning()
P2: package=Apache 
P3: content(config_file, [Includes|XBitHack]) 
Condition Set 
Presence 
RFC: 2616/HTTP,80+'any' Protocol,Port
Server Sides Include (SSI) on. Configuration 
Apache version 1.3.9, guestbook.pl. Vulnerable unit 
ANY OS
Apache GuestBook (CAN-1999-1053) Name 
Description 
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Severity Analysis
• Severity is based  on: host type, exposes resource type,  
difficulty to exploit the vulnerability, site policy 
1. qualitatively rank sets of hosts according to the site 
security priorities
2. qualitatively rank sets of exposed resources according to 
the site security priorities
Servers
Management
Employee
PA,CIA
NPA, CIA /*private*, CI 
/*,CIA 
Hosts Exposed Resources
PA = Privileged Account 
NPA= Non Privileged Account
C =  Confidentiality
I =  Integrity
A = Availability
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Quantifying Severity
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3. relatively quantifying the two rankings 
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Pilot Study
• Goal:  evaluate the feasibility and impact of the 
Intrusion Prevention Infrastructure
– Evaluate ease and effectiveness of finding/repairing 
vulnerabilities 
– define 300+ vulnerabilities using our presence and 
severity semantics  
– Evaluate use of severity semantics and analysis to 
quantify the relative value of site hosts and resources
• Site:  network with ~1500 hosts, 
strong configuration management, 
dedicated security administrator
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Pilot Study: Methodology
• simulated accurate audit:
– modeled each Nessus vulnerability using the presence 
and severity semantics
– manually removed all false positives from Nessus report
• simulated severity analysis:
– System administrator at site defined a severity model  
for each type of resource on each type of hosts
• Two phase experiment:
– site security “baseline”:  5 audits, one per month
– only the 5th audit results are given to the site admin.
– 6th audit one month after results were revealed
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easy password√-√1001-< CIA,PA >fingerCAN-1
buffer overflow√-√400-3< CIA,NPA >ftpCVE-3
buffer overflow√-√3003-< CIA,PA >ftpCVE-5
buffer overflow√-√410117< CIA,SA >ftpCVE-2
buffer overflow√√√280082< CIA,PA >sshCVE-1
BlockRUSeve-rity
Work
Stations
Ser-
vers
CommentsExposed 
Resources
Ser-
viceName
Site Prioritized Report (5th month)
PA – Privileged Account,
NPA – Non Privileged Account 
SA – Service Account
• Advantages:
• Concise
• Fine grained severity estimation
• Severity estimation combines inherent vulnerability 
severity with site dependent priorities  
B
RepairSeverity Analysis
U – Upgrade
R – Reconfig
B – Block
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Quantifying Severity 
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Audit Result Revealed
Accurate audit:
pinpointed severe vulnerabilities (highly alert site)
improved security practices (no new vulnerabilities in 6)
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Customized vs. non-Customized Report 
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Audit Result Revealed
Proposed severity model better represents the 
administrator’s security priorities 
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What to Take Home
• Intrusion prevention = vulnerable host identification +  
severity estimation + reliable repair
• Precise vulnerability semantics is necessary to facilitate 
these three tasks
• Frequent audits find vulnerabilities that the admin missed
• Severity analysis and prioritized report help the admin to 
understand the severity of the threat to their system
• Not in this talk (but in the paper) severity semantics, and  
difficulty semantics. Not in this work: repair process
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Questions?
